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Max Mosley goes to Strasbourg: Article 8, claimant notification and 
interim injunctions 
 
Gavin Phillipson
*
 
 
Introduction 
Lawyers acting for Max Mosley, following his victory in the High Court in 
London, have lodged an application at Strasbourg. They argue that English law is in 
violation of Article 8 of the Convention because it allows newspaper editors a 
complete discretion as to whether or not to contact potential claimants before stories 
invading their private lives are run. When editors chose not to notify such claimants, 
the effect is usually to deprive them of any opportunity to apply for an interim 
injunction to prevent publication. The basic argument is therefore that, in order to 
ensure effective protection for Article 8 rights, UK law needs in some way to provide 
that newspaper editors, before publishing such stories, should contact their subject (I 
shall refer to this as the „notification requirement‟).  At the time of writing, the Select 
Committee on Culture, Media and Sport
1
 is conducting an enquiry into privacy and 
libel laws, including consideration of the desirability of a notification requirement. It 
is also of course possible that, in a suitable case, a domestic court will be invited to 
rule on the point, given that it is unlikely that Strasbourg will consider the Mosley 
case in the near future. This article considers the merits of the arguments for a 
notification requirement.  
 The facts of the Mosley case are well known: in March and April 2008, the 
News of the World published a series of articles revealing that Max Mosley, President 
of the Fédération Internationale de l‟Automobile (F1) had engaged in group sex 
sessions, of a mildly sado-masochistic nature, with five prostitutes, in private, 
residential property. The information for the story had been obtained from one of the 
prostitutes hired to take part in the sessions, who had also used a hidden camera to 
make a video recording of the sexual activity.
2
 The video accompanied the story, 
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 Hereafter, in the text, „The Select Committee‟ and in footnotes, „SCCMS‟. 
2
 [2008] EWHC 687 (QB) (hereafter Mosley I), [5]. As described by the judge, the 
footage contained: „shots of Mr Mosley taking part in sexual activities with five 
 2 
which was headlined, „„F1 boss has sick Nazi orgy with 5 hookers‟ and contained 
explicit detail of the sexual activity, as well as numerous still photographs. The story 
alleged that the sexual role-play had Nazi overtones, an allegation that was found to 
be false at trial – a major reason why the judge concluded that the story had no public 
interest value. The litigation was in two stages: in the first, Mosley sought an interim 
injunction against further publication of the story and an order that the video be 
removed from the News of the World‟s website; this application was refused.3 At the 
trial of the action, the judge found in favour of Mosley‟s claim for infringement of his 
privacy,
4
 awarding an unprecedented £60,000 in damages.  
 
Is an interim injunction generally the only effective remedy in 
privacy cases?  
Academic and judicial opinion 
The first stage in the argument is to ascertain whether interim relief, in the 
form of an injunction, is of particular importance as a remedy in cases concerning 
private and/or confidential information. After all, the settled rule in the related field of 
defamation is that injunctions are not available where the defendant intends to plead 
justification (truth) and the Court of Appeal recently ruled that this remains the 
position following the Human Rights Act.
5
 However, it is immediately obvious that, 
as the author has previously argued,
6
 obtaining such injunctions is critical in privacy 
cases, far more so than in defamation.  This is because damage done to reputation by 
initial publication can be subsequently restored by a public finding that the allegation 
was false. An example is the recent Rushdie case:
7
 the well-known author won a libel 
case in August 2008 in respect of various allegations made about him by one of his 
former police bodyguards. Rushdie, recognising the ability of a definitive court 
statement setting out the erroneous nature of the allegations to restore the damage to 
                                                                                                                                            
prostitutes…The session seems to have been devoted mainly to activities which were 
conveniently described as “S and M.”‟ 
3
 Mosley I.  
4
 Hereafter Mosley II [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) [2008] EMLR 20. For comment, see 
K. Hughes, „Horizontal privacy‟ (Case Comment) (2009) 125(Apr) LQR, 244. 
5
 Greene v Associated Newspapers [2005] Q.B. 972.  
6
 „Breach of Confidence as a Privacy Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era‟ [2000] 
63(5) MLR 660, 691.  
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 „Rushdie wins apology - and spurns cash - in libel case‟ Guardian 27 August 2008.  
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his reputation, decided not to claim any damages: he was content with a declaration of 
falsity. Since the essence of a libel claim is that the allegations were untrue, the 
authoritative finding by a court of their falsity largely restores a damaged reputation. 
In contrast, if private information is made public by a newspaper article, the law can 
seek to compensate for this harm at final trial by awarding damages, but it cannot in 
any way cure the invasion of privacy: it cannot erase the information revealed from 
peoples‟ memories. The outcome of court cases cannot restore privacy in the way that 
it can restore reputation. As Professors Leigh and Lustgarten have commented: „the 
interim stage is the critical one. It is effectively the disposition of the matter‟.8 This is 
practically so also because, if an injunction is refused, and the information enters the 
public domain, many claimants will take the view that it is futile to continue with the 
litigation. Thus as two media lawyers put it: „In breach of confidence...the critical 
stage is usually the application for an interim injunction...If the publisher is able to 
publish...the action will often evaporate...‟9.  
There is overwhelming agreement on this point, not only from leading 
academic authorities in the field of privacy, but also from UK courts and other 
jurisdictions. Professor Barendt, author of the seminal comparative study, Freedom of 
Speech, has argued that: 
 
„If the publication disclosed material which an applicant was entitled and 
wanted to keep fully confidential or private…an injunction would then be the 
only effective remedy.‟10 
 
The same point is made by one of the leading authorities on privacy, Professor 
Raymond Wacks. He comments on this point: 
 
„In many cases, in exercising its discretion not to grant the plaintiff interim 
relief, the court is effectively deciding the substantive issue. This is 
particularly so in personal information actions…Because the plaintiff‟s only 
                                                 
8 I. Leigh and L. Lustgarten, „Making Rights Real: the Courts, Remedies, and the 
Human Rights Act‟ [1999] 55(3) CLJ 509, 533 (referring to the granting of interim 
injunctions generally); see also 551.
 
9
  G. Robertson and A. Nicol,
 
Media Law (London: Penguin, 3rd ed, 1992), 190.
 
10
 E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (OUP, 3nd ed, 2006), 137 (emphasis added). 
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concern is usually to prevent the information from being disclosed at all, the 
plaintiff will rarely proceed to trial after failing to gain interlocutory relief‟.11  
 
This was recognised by Eady J in the Mosley case itself: 
 
Whereas reputation can be vindicated by an award of damages, in the sense 
that the claimant can be restored to the esteem in which he was previously 
held, that is not possible where embarrassing personal information has been 
released for general publication. As the media are well aware, once privacy 
has been infringed, the damage is done and the embarrassment is only 
augmented by pursuing a court action. Claimants with the degree of resolve 
(and financial resources) of Mr Max Mosley are likely to be few and far 
between. Thus, if journalists successfully avoid the grant of an interlocutory 
injunction, they can usually relax in the knowledge that intrusive coverage of 
someone's sex life will carry no adverse consequences for them…12 
 
As Mosley himself has put it: 
 
if you go to court, [even if] you win…you are going to have the entire matter 
debated in public…That which was private that you did not want published, 
will be published all over again in more detail with [the newspaper] able in 
court to make any allegation they like about you because…their witnesses [are 
covered by] absolute privilege…13  
 
Sir Christopher Myers, Chair of the Press Complaints Commission, made the same 
point, although in this case he was using it to argue for the superiority of the PCC 
route over a trial for damages: 
 
The great deterrent on [taking] a privacy case into the courts is because if you 
are concerned that some intimate detail of your private life has been 
                                                 
11
 Privacy and Press Freedom (Blackstone, 1995), 156.  
12
 Mosley II, [230].  
13
 SCCMS, Oral evidence, HC 275-i, Q 122 (2008-09). Absolute privilege is afforded 
to fair and accurate reportage of court proceedings: Defamation Act 1996, s 14.  
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exposed… the very sin of which you were complaining…is then thrown into 
open court where every nook and cranny and crevice - almost literally in Mr 
Mosley's case - is then exposed to the public gaze over and over as 
prosecution [sic] and defence throw the shaved buttocks backwards and 
forwards across the courtroom.
14
  
 
Numerous other judicial decisions have recognised the point that „an 
injunction is the primary remedy for a claimant who wishes to protect privacy.‟15 The 
Court of Appeal has recently noted that, „Confidentiality…will be lost completely if 
an injunction against disclosure is not granted when appropriate‟,16 while the House 
of Lord‟s leading judgment on interim injunctions under the Human Rights Act has 
noted that, „Confidentiality, once breached, is lost for ever.‟17 In an important decision 
on privacy under the Human Rights Act, the Court of Appeal recognised that, „…if 
the injunction is not granted, the claimant may be deprived of the only remedy that is 
of any value‟. 18 Indeed, „If an interim injunction is to be granted, it is essential that it 
is granted promptly because otherwise the newspaper will be published and then, 
from the claimant's point of view, the damage will have been done.‟19  
 The second Court of Appeal judgment in the well known Douglas v Hello 
litigation
20
 also affirmed this point:  
Damages, particularly [a modest] sum, cannot fairly be regarded as an adequate 
remedy…Particularly in the light of the state of competition in the newspaper and 
magazine industry, the refusal of an interlocutory injunction in a case such as this 
represents a strong potential disincentive to respect for aspects of private life, 
which the Convention intends should be respected.
21
  
                                                 
14
 SCCMS, Oral evidence, HC 275-v, Q 346 (2008-09) 
15
 Matrix Media and Information Group, Privacy and the Media – the Developing 
Law (2002), 52.  
16
 Greene v Associated Newspapers [2005] Q.B. 972, [78].  
17
 Cream Holdings Limited and others v. Banerjee and others [2004] 3 W.L.R. 918.  
18
  [2002] 3 WLR 542, [11](ii).  
19
 Ibid, [7].  
20
 Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 3) [2006] QB 125.  
21
 Ibid, [257].  
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It concluded that, „Only by the grant of an interlocutory injunction could the 
Douglases‟ rights have been satisfactorily protected.‟22  
 This fundamental point as to the particular importance of injunctive relief to 
the protection of privacy has also been appreciated elsewhere in Europe. Professor 
Barendt notes that, „In many jurisdictions, courts may grant injunctions to stop the 
issue of publications which, it is argued, would amount to a breach of confidence [or] 
infringe personal privacy.
23
 This is the case, for example, in France and Germany. As 
one commentator on French Law points out, „Article 9 of the Code Civil allows an 
efficient protection, i.e. the seizure of the contested publication, for „unbearable 
breaches‟ of private life or for breaches of the „intimate private life.‟‟24 She goes on to 
note:  
In most cases, plaintiffs prefer to prevent or to stop a breach to their „intimate 
private life‟ happening. As a result, this emergency remedy has become the 
general remedy for the protection of private life, as opposed to normal 
procedures where judges award damages after the breach has happened.
25
  
 
The authors of a recent leading work on civil law protection for privacy and 
personality remark that:  
 
„The efficiency of the protection depends here, more than in other fields, on 
rapid judicial intervention, especially when the alleged violation of the right 
to…one‟s private life occurs in a transitory publication such as a newspaper or 
magazine. After a few days the violation is complete and measures aimed at 
preventing the publication would no longer make any sense‟.26 
 
They go on to cite a French commentator, who notes that injunctive relief is necessary 
in cases of disclosure of intimate personal information, since „the later award of 
                                                 
22
 Ibid, [259].  
23
 Freedom of Speech, 117.  
24
 C. Dupre, „The Protection of Private Life Against Freedom of Expression in French 
Law‟ (2000) 6 EHRLR 627, 649.  
25
 Ibid, 642 (emphasis added). 
26
 H. Beverly-Smith, A. Ohly and A. Lucas-Schloetter, Privacy, Property and 
Personality (CUP, 2005), 182.  
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damages cannot adequately redress this kind of harm‟.27 Similarly in German law, 
interim injunctions may be obtained to prevent publications interfering with rights of 
personality. Professor Barendt notes that, while censorship is prohibited by Article 
5(1) of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), this „has never been applied to preclude the 
granting of a temporary judicial order (einstweiligeVerfügung) to prevent a 
publication.‟28 Injunctions may therefore be granted if the applicant‟s claim appears to 
be „well-founded‟ and where interim relief „is necessary in order to prevent a 
significant detriment.‟29 
The European Court of Human Rights has itself recognized the particular 
importance of injunctive relief in this area, in the well known Spycatcher case,
30
 
which concerned a challenge to the compatibility of interim injunctions made by UK 
courts to prevent publication of the book Spycatcher.  The initial injunctions, which 
prevented publication of extracts from the book in UK newspapers for over a year, 
were found not to violate Article 10: they were held to be justified on the basis that 
they had the aim of maintaining the Attorney-General‟s ability to bring a case claiming 
permanent injunctions. As the Court said, the UK courts granted these injunctions, 
because: 
 
to refuse interlocutory injunctions would mean that [the newspaper] would be 
free to publish that material immediately and before the substantive trial; this 
would effectively deprive the Attorney General, if successful on the merits, of 
his right to be granted a permanent injunction, thereby irrevocably destroying 
the substance of his actions.
31
 
 
It was on this basis that the Court found no violation of Article 10 in relation to the 
temporary injunctions up to 30 July 1987 (after which the secrecy of the information 
was lost by publication abroad). It may be argued that the same considerations do not 
always apply with information relating to private life, as opposed to state secrets – 
                                                 
27
 Ravanas, „La protection des personnes contra la réalisation et la publication de leur 
image‟ LGDJ 1978, P. 459. See also Deriexux, „Référé et liberté d‟expression, JCP 
1997 I, 40533, No. 6.  
28
 Freedom of Speech ,125. 
29
 If there has not yet been any publication, „the claimant must show that an imminent 
danger of a violation exists‟: n 26 above, 139.  
30
 Observer and Guardian v UK (1991) 14 EHRR 153.  
31
 Ibid, [62].  
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with which Spycatcher was of course concerned. As noted below,
32
 English courts 
now seem to take the view that prior publication may not destroy a claimant‟s claim 
in relation to personal information, particularly if the case concerns photographs. If 
this rule becomes firmly established in English law, it would render the Strasbourg 
reasoning in Spycatcher less applicable to such cases, but it is submitted that this is 
not yet the case - as the failure of Mosley‟s attempt to procure the removal of the 
video from the NoW website vividly demonstrates.
33
  
 
Does Strasbourg require injunctive relief for the protection of Article 8 
rights? 
Until Max Mosley‟s case is heard, we will not of course know for certain 
whether Strasbourg requires effective access to a preventative remedy in cases 
concerning media publication of private information. Many Convention lawyers 
might well seek to refute the argument that the Convention could impose any such 
specific requirements: it would be pointed out that when considering the state‟s 
positive obligations to ensure respect for private life in the context of regulating 
relations between private individuals, the effect of the wide margin of appreciation 
that the Court applies in such cases is that the means of securing such „respect‟ is left 
within the discretion of the state. As the Strasbourg court has remarked on a number 
of occasions: 
 
…as regards such positive obligations, the notion of „respect‟ is not clear-cut. 
In view of the diversity of the practices followed and the situations obtaining 
in the Contracting States, the notion's requirements will vary considerably 
from case to case. Accordingly, this is an area in which the Contracting Parties 
enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in determining the steps to be taken to 
ensure compliance with the Convention, account being taken of the needs and 
resources of the community and of individuals.
34
  
 
                                                 
32
 See 000-000.  
33
 See below, text to n 48 et seq.  
34
 Armonas v Lithuania, 36919/02 (25 Nov 2008, [38]; Johnston and Others v. 
Ireland, (1986), A 112, [55]. 
 9 
Therefore, the argument would go, states cannot be required by Article 8 to provide 
for any particular remedy in national law.  Such an argument, however, is now out of 
date. First of all, the recent decision in Armonas v Lithuania
35
 indicates clearly that 
the Court is now prepared to stipulate as to the remedy required to protect Article 8 
rights against the media. The applicant‟s husband had brought a successful action for 
invasion of privacy against a newspaper that had revealed his HIV status. National 
law limited the maximum award for non-pecuniary loss to €2,896. The applicant 
applied to Strasbourg, alleging that this limit on recovery of damages to such a small 
sum had deprived her husband of an effective remedy. The Court agreed, finding a 
breach of Article 8. The state party argued that, „The State enjoys a wide margin of 
appreciation in determining the measures required for the better implementation of 
[the] obligation [to respect private life]…‟. The Court „reiterated‟ the broad principle 
set out above, but went on:  
 
The Court nonetheless recalls that Article 8, like any other provision of the 
Convention…must be interpreted in such a way as to guarantee not rights that 
are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and effective.
36
  
 
Thus, „the State had an obligation to ensure that the husband was able effectively to 
enforce [his Article rights] against the press.
37
 The Court went on to find that while 
reasonable limits to the award of damages would of course be permissible, „such 
limits must not be such as to deprive the individual of his or her privacy and thereby 
empty the right of its effective content.‟38  The Court found that the severe limit placed 
upon the quantum of damages was such that the state „failed to provide the applicant 
with the protection that could have legitimately been expected under Article 8…‟.  
It is particularly noteworthy that the Court did not even find it necessary to 
invoke the Article 13 right to an effective remedy
39
 in this case. The applicant argued 
a breach of that provision, but the Court said simply that in its view „the complaint 
under Article 13 as to the absence of an effective domestic remedy is subsidiary to the 
                                                 
35
 36919/02 (25 Nov 2008).   
36
 Ibid, citing Shevanova v. Latvia, 58822/00, (2006), [69].  
37
 Ibid, [43] (emphasis added).  
38
 Ibid [46] (emphasis added). 
39
 Article 13 provides: „Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this 
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority…‟  
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complaint under Article 8.‟40 In other words, the low level of damages awarded did 
not just mean that there was no effective remedy: rather Article 8 itself was breached 
thereby. The Court thus held  that the state‟s positive obligation to show respect for 
private life in itself requires a certain kind of remedy – a striking example of just how 
interventionist the Court has become in this area. More practically, this point is of 
great interest to English lawyers: since the Human Rights Act does not of course 
incorporate Article 13 into domestic law, this decision allows arguments about 
remedies for Article 8 to be made in domestic courts purely under Article 8; the non-
applicability of Article 13 in domestic law will not be a handicap.  
Armonas thus disposes of the view that the state‟s positive obligations under 
Article 8 cannot impose a requirement for any particular remedy. But more striking 
still – and of particular relevance to the argument of this paper – is the recent decision 
in I v Finland.
41
 In this case, the Court addressed the issue of effective protection for 
sensitive personal information, in the context of an application alleging a violation of 
Article 8 in respect of disclosures of the applicant‟s HIV status from an insecure 
medical records database.  Finding for the applicant, the Court found: 
 
…the mere fact that the domestic legislation provided the applicant with an 
opportunity to claim compensation for damages caused by an alleged unlawful 
disclosure of personal data was not sufficient to protect her private life. What 
is required in this connection is practical and effective protection to exclude 
any possibility of unauthorised access occurring in the first place. Such 
protection was not given here [and] the Court cannot but conclude that at the 
relevant time the State failed in its positive obligation under Article 8 § 1…42 
 
The Court thus plainly recognized that the absence of effective prospective means of 
ensuring the security of personal information against unauthorized disclosure may 
itself amount to a breach of Article 8, despite the availability of ex post facto 
compensatory damages. Once again, the finding was made without the need to rely on 
Article 13. While this case concerned a breach by a state-run hospital, the same 
principles would doubtless apply in the context of media intrusion, since as decisions 
                                                 
40
 n 38 above, [23].  
41
 20511/03 (17 July 2008).  
42
 Ibid, [47-48] (emphasis added).  
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such as Armonas and Von Hannover v Germany
43
 make abundantly clear, states owe a 
positive obligation to their citizens to ensure effective protection of Article 8 against 
private media bodies also.  
   
The central argument: claimant notification essential to effective 
Article 8 protection.  
 
There is thus more or less universal agreement that in most cases involving 
unauthorised disclosure of sensitive personal information, an injunction is the only 
effective remedy. The Strasbourg court also appears to have accepted that, at least in 
serious cases, only a method by which such disclosure may be prevented can satisfy 
Article 8. Once this is accepted, it then becomes very hard to regard the current 
situation, in which newspapers may in effect deny a claimant the right to apply for 
such an injunction through non-notification as one that assures the „practical and 
effective‟ protection for Article 8 that Strasbourg requires.  
This is particularly so since it appears that tabloid newspapers often do not 
give notice, seemingly with the deliberate intention of avoiding the possibility of an 
injunction.
44
 Giving evidence to the Select Committee enquiry, Mark Thomson, of 
Carter Ruck, a leading claimant firm, said: „It used to be when I started in practice the 
media would notify. Nowadays generally the tabloid media do not.‟45 There is indeed 
evidence that, in order to avoid the possibility of an injunction being obtained late on 
Saturday night, Sunday newspapers – the first editions of which are available at about 
10pm on Saturday night in central London – sometimes run what is termed a „spoof‟ 
first edition, in which the contentious story does not appear; it is included in the 
                                                 
43
  (2004) 40 EHRR 1.  
44
 No notice was given, for example, in Max Mosley itself, nor in the recent case 
concerning the international chef, Gordon Ramsey, in which the News of the World 
revealed that he was having an extra-matrimonial affair and gave details of recent 
sexual encounters with this alleged mistress 
(www.newsoftheworld.co.uk/news/article83126.ece), and none was given in the 
singer Madonna‟s recent case against the Daily Mail in relation to unauthorised use of 
photographs of her wedding („Madonna claims £5 million for “stolen” wedding 
photographs‟ The Daily Telegraph 8 Dec 08).  
45
 SCCMS, Oral evidence, HC 275-i, Q107 (2008-09). The Memorandum by 
Schillings solicitors stated: „The News of the World admitted in the Burrell case above 
that they did not give Mr Burrell notice because they were concerned that he might 
have obtained an „unmeritorious‟ injunction. Colin Myler also admitted the same in 
the course of the Mosley…privacy trial.‟ (SCCMS, Memoranda: Press Standards, 
Privacy and Libel (2008-09)). 
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second edition, which goes out in the middle of the night, making it impossible to stop 
the story.
46
 Essentially, unless the subject of the story happens to be tipped off about it 
in advance by a rumour, the opportunity to apply for the all-important injunctive 
remedy is granted or withheld solely at the discretion of a newspaper editor. It may 
even be said that in practice at least the availability of this remedy is not „in 
accordance with the law‟ as Article 8(2) requires, since the law in no way governs or 
even influences whether an applicant has the opportunity to obtain this remedy.  
This situation is made all the worse because of the fact that newspaper editors, 
in deciding whether to notify the potential claimant before publication, have a clear 
commercial inducement not to do so: editors know that if they can once get the story 
published, not only are any eventual damages likely to be modest, but that most 
claimants are unlikely to bother to take legal proceedings, being fully aware that their 
privacy has already been irreparably damaged, and that litigation will only aggravate 
this fact, by hugely adding to the publicity given to the original revelations. It is 
submitted therefore that effective protection for privacy cannot, consistently with the 
UK‟s duty to uphold it, be left in the hands of the very persons – newspaper editors – 
who have least reason to uphold it. Mr Mosley has expressed the point with some 
eloquence himself: 
 
The moment you say that it should not be obligatory to give the individual an 
opportunity to take the matter before a judge what you are really saying is that 
in carrying out this sometimes very delicate weighing balance between Article 
8 of the Convention and Article 10 the best and most qualified person to carry 
out that delicate weighing up…is not a High Court judge but the editor of a 
tabloid, and not just [any] editor…but the editor…who is dying to publish the 
very story which is the subject matter of this weighing…To say [this] is so 
manifestly absurd that I do not think any rational person could support that 
argument.
47
 
 
The effect of denying the applicant the opportunity to apply for a pre-
publication injunction is well illustrated by the fate of Mr Mosley‟s application for an 
                                                 
46
 Ibid, Oral evidence of Max Mosley, Q 130: Mosley stated that this occurred in 
relation to both his and the Gordon Ramsey story.  
47
 SCCMS, Oral evidence, HC 275-I, Q 130 (2008-09). 
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injunction to remove the video from the News of the World website, which, it will be 
recalled, showed intimate details of sexual activity, surreptitiously recorded on private 
property.
48
 Mr Mosley, not having been notified before the story was broken and the 
video posted on the website, was naturally anxious that at least the video be removed 
as soon as he became aware of it, pending the trial of his case. However, by the time, 
the interim application was heard, it was found as a fact that the footage „had been 
viewed about 1,424,959 times‟.49 This was partly because, as is likely to happen with 
the internet, the video had been copied into other websites, as the judge found: 
 
the footage could have been accessed via the Internet by users who were 
visiting other websites in which the footage had been „embedded‟. It was also 
made available on the Internet by other websites which had copied it while 
still available on the News of the World website. It follows that there are a 
number of websites (not possible to quantify accurately) where the footage has 
been available continuously, notwithstanding its removal from the News of the 
World website.
50
 
 
In determining whether to order he should order the removal of the video, despite its 
massive exposure to the public, Eady J took fully into account the principle 
enunciated in a number of previous judgments that in relation to the effect of prior 
publicity, information relating to private life, particularly visual images, should be 
treated differently from other kinds of confidential information. Whereas it is 
generally accepted that once confidential information has been publicised, no purpose 
will be served by granting an injunction, one on the basis that the information‟s 
confidential quality has been irretrievably lost, photographs of private occasions may 
be treated differently. As the Court of Appeal observed in the Douglas case:  
 
                                                 
48
 Mosley I, [4]:  „The very brief extracts which I was shown seemed to consist mainly 
of people spanking each other's bottoms. There were discreet blocks…to make sure 
that no private parts were on display (or…the prostitutes' faces).‟ 
49
 Ibid, [7]. 
50
 Ibid, [7] & [8]. The video had been voluntarily withdrawn pending the outcome of 
the application for the injunction: following the decision not to grant one, it was 
restored to the NoW website. 
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Insofar as a photograph does more than convey information and intrudes on 
privacy by enabling the viewer to focus on intimate personal detail, there will 
be a fresh intrusion of privacy when each additional viewer sees the 
photograph and even when one who has seen a previous publication of the 
photograph is confronted by a fresh publication of it.
51
 
 
Similar comments have been made in another decision.
52
 It would thus have been 
theoretically possible for Eady J to order an injunction in this case. Of course, even if 
he had felt able to do so, the video footage of the S/M activities would have been 
watched by over a million people and Mr Mosley‟s sexual life thus comprehensively 
laid bare to the public. However, in the event, even this unsatisfactory remedy was 
withheld. The decisive factor was that the footage had by then been copied onto other 
websites, as the judge found. Thus, even had an order been made that the News of the 
World should remove it from its website, this would not have prevented the footage 
being accessed from other websites, some of which may have been in other 
jurisdictions and beyond the reach of UK courts. Eady J therefore took the view that 
to grant an injunction would have been a futile act:  
 
The Court should guard against slipping into playing the role of King Canute. 
Even though an order may be desirable for the protection of privacy, and may 
be made in accordance with the principles currently being applied by the 
courts, there may come a point where it would simply serve no useful 
purpose….I have, with some reluctance, come to the conclusion that although 
this material is intrusive and demeaning, and despite the fact that there is no 
legitimate public interest in its further publication, the granting of an order…at 
the present juncture would merely be a futile gesture. Anyone who wishes to 
access the footage can easily do so, and there is no point in barring the News 
of the World from showing what is already available.
53
 
 
The outcome of this case was therefore as follows: by the simple expedient of not 
notifying Mr Mosley before the story was broken, the News of the World effectively 
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denied him any chance of preventing well over a million people from seeing explicit 
images of the most intimate sexual activity, secretly recorded on his private property – 
images that the judge eventually found to be grossly invasive of his privacy and 
attracting no legitimate public interest. As the judge noted in his final judgment, „no 
amount of damages can fully compensate the Claimant for the damage done. He is 
hardly exaggerating when he says that his life was ruined.‟54 Mr Mosley himself has 
said of the effect of such revelations: 
 
It is the most terrible thing you can imagine…It is like taking all your goods, 
taking all your money; in fact it is worse because if someone took your goods 
and your money you have some chance of replacing it - even if you are not 
insured you can work - but if somebody takes away your dignity, for want of a 
better word, you can never replace it. No matter how long I live, no matter 
what part of the world I go to, people will know about it.
55
  
 
The position in the related field of the law of defamation is strikingly different. 
Even though it is widely accepted that the primary remedy for defamatory allegations 
is damages, English law already lays a strong legal incentive upon media bodies to 
notify the subject of their stories in advance, and at least give them a chance to 
comment on them, and ensure that the account published contains their side of the 
story. This is because newspapers must generally ensure that they engage in prior 
claimant notification if they wish to be able avail themselves of the public interest 
defence to defamation set out in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd:
56
 under Reynolds 
privilege, journalists may escape liability for defamation where the matter published 
was of serious public concern and they took reasonable care as journalists to verify 
the accuracy of the story and act responsibly. One of the matters that a court is 
specifically required to consider under the well known „10-point checklist‟ is, 
„Whether comment had been sought from the plaintiff in advance of publication‟. A 
failure to do so can be fatal to a claim for public interest privilege.
57
 In this respect, 
Reynolds is clearly reflective of the Strasbourg notion that journalism is to be 
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exercised responsibly and with due consideration for the rights of others, a notion 
based partly on the wording of Article 10, that the exercise of free speech rights 
„carries with it duties and responsibilities‟; hence the oft-repeated warning that „the 
press must not overstep the bounds set, inter alia, for the protection of the reputation 
of others‟.58 Decision such as Pedersen & Baadsgaard v Denmark,59 Barford60, and 
Radio France
61
 all illustrate this principle well. In Bladet Tromso the Court said that 
the press should be protected, providing that „they are acting in good faith in order to 
provide accurate and reliable information in accordance with the ethics of 
journalism‟.62 In the admissibility decision of Times Newspapers v UK,63 which 
concerned the Louthansky
64
 libel case, the Court noted, as one reason for finding 
reasonable the High Court courts‟ assessment that Reynolds privilege was not made 
out, the fact that, „The story was not particularly urgent and Mr Loutchansky had not 
even been contacted or given the opportunity to defend himself prior to publication.‟65 
The proposed notification requirement is thus soundly rooted in Strasbourg 
jurisprudence, as simply another aspect of the general principle of journalistic 
responsibility.  
Findings made by Strasbourg in the context of Article 13, the right to an 
effective remedy for violations of Convention rights, are also illuminating. The Court 
has said that:  
 
„while Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in 
which they conform to their obligations under [Art 13]…the remedy must be 
effective in practice as well as in law‟.66  
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This is precisely in line with the argument advanced in this paper: whilst a satisfactory 
remedy in the form of an injunction is available in theory, it is „not effective in 
practice‟ if it can be – and is – denied at the discretion of newspaper editors. A 
leading text on the Convention notes that a wholly discretionary remedy will 
generally not be an effective one.
67
 Moreover, the remedy-granting body must be 
„sufficiently independent‟ of the rights-violating body.68 The precise objection to 
English law granting newspapers complete discretion as to whether to notify 
claimants before publication is that the decision whether to effectively deny the only 
effective remedy for invasion of privacy is made by a body that far from being 
„independent‟ of the rights-violator is the violator itself – a body with a clear vested 
interest in denying the claimant the possibility of seeking that remedy. This is not of 
course the same position as if the newspaper had the legal power to grant or withhold 
an injunction – an obviously unreal possibility - but it is argued that to allow 
newspapers this power in practice must also be seen as a violation of the 
Convention.
69
  
 
Buttressing the notification argument: newspaper stories that pose a real 
threat to life and limb.  
 
There is a further consideration which, it is submitted, provides substantial support to 
the basic argument outlined above. It derives from cases in which courts have made 
orders against the media to protect the identity of persons seeking rehabilitation in 
society after serving sentences for crimes that have attracted such notoriety that there 
appeared to be a well-founded fear that were their identity and whereabouts to be 
revealed, they would be subject to harassment and possibly vigilante attacks involving 
serious violence. For example, in Venables v News Group Newspapers,
70
 Butler Sloss 
P granted unprecedented injunctions against the whole world preventing publication 
of any material which might reveal the identity and whereabouts of Venables and 
Thompson, who many years previously, as juveniles, had murdered the toddler Jamie 
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Bulger.
71
 Such was the degree of public hostility to the two applicants that there was 
convincing evidence before the court that a failure thus to protect their anonymity 
could leave the court accused of failing to secure their rights under Articles 2 and 3 of 
the Convention, in addition to their right to privacy under Article 8.  An order was 
made in similar circumstances in X (A woman formerly known as Mary Bell) v 
O’Brien,72 „to protect the Article 8 rights of the applicant and her daughter, who had 
on five occasions been forced to move home following the discovery of their 
whereabouts and harassment by the press.‟73 A similar injunction was granted in Carr 
v News Group Newspapers,
74
 to protect a woman convicted of perverting the course 
of justice for providing a false alibi for her partner who had killed two children in 
2002, in a case that had attracted massive publicity. In each case, the court was able to 
hear an application before any disclosure was made, but without a claimant 
notification requirement, this is by no means guaranteed in future similar cases.  
Less extreme but still indicative of the attitude of the press, is the well known 
case of Re S.
75
 This case arose in the course of a murder trial that had also attracted 
great publicity, in which a mother was accused of murdering one of her children. The 
Guardian of the brother of the murdered child sought an injunction preventing the 
press from revealing information that would identify him. This was on the basis that 
there was expert evidence to the effect that revelation of the child‟s identity, exposing 
him publicity and to probable bullying and harassment at school, would be likely to 
cause him significant psychological harm and impair his recovery from the terrible 
experience he had been through:
76
 he was already the subject of care proceedings and 
in a profoundly traumatised state. Nevertheless, three national newspapers intervened 
in the case, in order to argue that the order should be lifted, allowing them to reveal 
the mother‟s, and thus the boy‟s identity.77  
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All these cases show that newspapers are quite prepared to publish 
information even where there is clear evidence that doing so may lead to a serious risk 
to a person‟s physical safety or their mental health, even (as in Re S) where that 
person is  wholly innocent and vulnerable child. A notification requirement in English 
law would help ensure that the vital interests of such people, including their 
Convention rights to life and freedom from inhuman treatment, could be protected by 
a court by injunction, if it seemed necessary. The absence of any such requirement not 
only allows newspaper editors unilaterally to strip people of effective protection of 
their Article 8 rights, but also to put their very lives at risk.   
 
Buttressing the notification argument: journalistic contempt for Article 8 
and the judiciary. 
 
As noted above, the Strasbourg court has repeatedly held that journalists are 
bound by the Convention to accept certain responsibilities, including a proper level of 
respect and consideration for the rights of others, in particular their rights to 
reputation and privacy, guaranteed by the Convention itself. However, it is painfully 
apparent that many prominent UK tabloid journalists are openly hostile, not only to 
the notion of the protection of privacy but also to the very judges who are seeking to 
ensure balanced protection for Article 8 under the UK‟s Human Rights Act. This is 
relevant, not only because it tends to negate any argument that the press can be relied 
upon itself to notify claimants in advance of stories, as an aspect of responsible 
journalism, but also because recent statements emanating from the tabloid media 
make plain that newspapers openly support their right to invade the privacy of others 
in order to ensure their economic survival. Paul Dacre is not only the editor of the 
best-selling middle market tabloid newspapers, The Daily Mail, he is also Chair of the 
Editor‟s Code Committee of the Press Complaints Commission, which has the role of 
setting standards for the print media on the obtaining and publishing of private 
information by newspapers and adjudicating upon complaints. Mr Dacre‟s attitude 
towards privacy is therefore of considerable importance. In a recent public lecture,
78
 
which attracted much publicity, he launched an outspoken and highly personal attack 
not only upon the development of a right to privacy in English law, but upon one 
particular High Court judge, Justice Eady, who has delivered more judgments in the 
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area than any other. His central (inaccurate) charge was that Justice Eady was single-
handedly imposing upon the media a „backdoor‟ law of privacy. It is not proposed 
here to point out the obvious, numerous flaws in Dacre‟s argument,79  but simply to 
highlight the relevance of his attack for the present discussion.   
The speech is revealing firstly for the sheer animosity it displays by sections 
of the press towards the judges who are doing nothing more than developing a law of 
privacy in line with the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg court, as the Human Rights 
Act envisages. Mr Dacre said: „This law is not coming from Parliament…but from the 
arrogant and amoral judgements – words I use very deliberately – of one man‟ – 
Justice Eady, whom he described as, a „judge with a subjective and highly relativist 
moral sense‟. He added that, „The freedom of the press…is far too important to be left 
to the somewhat desiccated values of a single judge, who clearly has an animus 
against the popular press and the right of people to freedom of expression‟, and he 
lamented the effect of the „wretched‟ Human Rights Act. Mr Dacre‟s views have been 
supported by other prominent tabloid editors: Rebekka Wade, editor of the best-
selling Sun newspaper, said: „As a paper we agree with everything [Dacre] said. It is 
long overdue…‟. 80 The News of the World itself responded to the Mosley judgment 
by claiming that the British media „is being strangled by stealth‟ as a result of judges 
following „guidance from judges in Strasbourg who are unfriendly to freedom of 
expression.‟81   
 Of direct relevance to the argument of this paper is the fact that Mr Dacre 
openly takes the view that it is for the press – not the courts – to decide when a 
person‟s private life should be laid bare to the public, on the basis that some might 
take the view that what he or she had done, while perfectly legal, was contrary to their 
own standards of morality. Thus Mr Dacre argues: 
 
From time immemorial public shaming has been a vital element in defending 
the parameters of what are considered acceptable standards of social 
behaviour, helping ensure that citizens…adhere to them for the good of the 
                                                 
79
 See e.g. the comments of The Campaign for Press and Broadcasting Freedom in 
their Memorandum, [4.1]: SCCMS, Memoranda: Press Standards, Privacy and Libel 
(2008-09)).  
80
 www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/nov/11/paul-dacre-daily-mail-privacy.  
81
 See Press Gazette, 24 July 2008: 
www.pressgazette.co.uk/story.asp?storycode=41787.  
 21 
greater community. For hundreds of years, the press has played a vital role in 
that process. It has the freedom to identify those who have offended public 
standards of decency…and hold the transgressors up to public condemnation.   
 
Since it is clear that in modern pluralistic societies, there is huge variation in terms of 
moral standards on intimate matters of judgment such as sexual conduct, what the 
editor is asserting in effect is a right for newspaper editors to decide for themselves 
what conduct is immoral and so should be revealed to the public. Mr Dacre remarked 
that, „most people would consider [the sexual activities of Mosley] to be perverted, 
depraved, the very abrogation of civilised behaviour of which the law is supposed to 
be the safeguard.‟82 The point he misses of course, is that it is precisely in order to 
avoid the courts, as representatives of the state, having to make moral judgments 
about the private sexual behaviour of individuals that judges such as Eady J have 
begun to adopt a stance of moral neutrality in such cases (except of course in 
instances in which behaviour is revealed that might genuinely be thought to pertain to 
the public conduct of an important public servant).
83
 Mr Dacre‟s comments are 
revealing because they evince clearly his belief that privacy protection should be 
subject to the judgement of newspaper editors as to what is and is not immoral. Those 
holding such views are highly unlikely to give the subjects of their stories any chance 
to prevent them running: indeed they evidently regard themselves, rather than the 
courts, as being the proper judges of the boundary between private life and public 
scandal.  
 Finally there is a very clear admission in Mr Dacre‟s speech that in his view, 
an important reason why newspapers should be free to cover sexual scandal is that 
such stories help to sell newspapers – and that, particularly in difficult economic 
times, newspapers need to be able to make money by selling the private lives of 
others. Thus Mr Dacre commented:  
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if mass-circulation newspapers, which, of course, also devote considerable 
space to reporting and analysis of public affairs, don‟t have the freedom to 
write about scandal, I doubt whether they will retain their mass circulations, 
with the obvious worrying implications for the democratic process.  
 
Earlier in his speech, he referred to privacy law as „undermining the ability of mass 
circulation newspapers to sell newspapers in an ever more difficult market.‟ These 
comments amount to a perhaps surprising admission that newspapers are directly 
motivated by commercial considerations when running stories concerning intimate 
aspects of private life: once again this suggests that editors are prepared to make the 
calculation that non-notification of a story, precluding any possibility of an injunction, 
is the best way to serve those commercial interests. It is true of course that 
newspapers are commercial entities and need to make a profit.
84
 However, the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence envisages that journalists should carry on their vital role in 
society both with respect for the rights of others, including their rights to privacy, and 
with respect for the framework of law, particularly human rights law, within which 
they must carry on their business. Were this to represent the reality of the UK tabloid 
media, the notification requirement argued for here might not be necessary: what is 
striking about Mr Dacre‟s comments is that it indicates an outright rejection of respect 
for either the right to privacy or the courts. In such a climate, it is evident that the law 
must do more to compel such respect.  
 
Objections to the notification requirement: a risk of stifling the 
press?  
Interim injunctions and freedom of speech: general considerations 
 
In the author‟s view, the only real argument against some kind of „notification 
requirement‟ is the fear that such a requirement would lead to interim injunctions 
being routinely deployed to stifle serious journalism, with courts unable properly to 
consider genuine public interest arguments advanced by the media in such cases. 
While it is accepted that this fear may have been justified prior to the inception of the 
                                                 
84
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Human Rights Act 1998, it is submitted that the particular provisions relevant to 
interim relief introduced in that legislation, namely section 12, lay that fear to rest. 
The best known dicta from the Strasbourg court on interim injunctions is its 
observation that,  
 
„the dangers inherent in prior restraints are such that they call for the most 
careful scrutiny on the part of the court. This is especially so as far as the press 
is concerned, for news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication, 
even for a short period, may well deprive it of all its value and interest.‟85 
 
It may be noted first of all that the „perishablility‟ argument would not apply on facts 
like those in Mosley – a delay of a few months on such a story would not have made 
any difference to its newsworthiness. Indeed it should be noted that the argument is not 
a normative proposition but amounts only to a rather large generalisation about factual 
phenomena – that delay will often deprive a story of its value; as such it should 
generally be treated with caution and not assumed to apply in every case. Moreover, 
the Court has used the same language – stressing the need for „careful scrutiny‟ - about 
any measures or sanctions „capable of discouraging the participation of the press in 
debates on matters of legitimate public concern.‟86  
There are, of course further well known arguments of principle against the use 
of prior restraints, mainly originating from the United States, in which they are 
presumptively unconstitutional. Barendt quotes Alexander Bickel‟s well known adage, 
„[A] criminal statute chills, prior restraint freezes‟,87 noting that „an order not to 
publish material means that it can never legally see the light of day, while a publisher 
faced only by the prospect of a criminal prosecution may decide to take the risk and 
release the work‟.88 Or as the US Supreme Court has put it:89 „A prior restraint has an 
immediate and irreversible sanction‟. It is argued, in other words, that a prior restraint 
definitely punishes both author (by preventing her from speaking) and audience, by 
depriving them of the material in question. This analysis has been subject to sustained 
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criticism,
90
 in particular based on the lack of attention traditional US constitutional 
doctrine pays to the difference between a temporary judicial order and a system of 
censorship or perpetual restraints. This is not the place to re-rehearse these arguments. 
Rather, it may simply be noted that the above points apply only weakly to interim 
injunctions – the subject of this paper. If the newspaper wins at final trial then the 
material will be published and the speech rights of both audience and publisher will 
have been not denied but delayed only – perhaps only for a few months.91 Indeed a 
delay in publishing a story such as Mosley‟s would hurt a publisher less than a large 
award of damages, and, more importantly, in some ways, a huge costs order. Media 
organisations have voiced great concern to the Select Committee enquiry as to the 
effect of Conditional Fee Arrangements on costs orders made against media parties, 
and alleged concomitant pressure to settle cases considered legally defendable, due to 
the fear of massive liability in costs should the case be lost.
92
 As one of the claimant 
lawyers pointed out to the Committee in oral evidence: 
 
I think [a notification requirement] would also make an enormous difference 
in terms of the amount of follow-on litigation. All the lawyers here will make 
most of their money from litigating [after publication]…We do not make as 
much money from dealing with a story prior to publication...
93
 
 
In other words, settling the issue at the interim stage is both quicker and far cheaper 
than proceeding to final trial to decide the issue in terms of damages. However, this of 
course depends upon how satisfactory is the test adopted at that stage.  
 
Interim injunctions: the effect of section 12 HRA 
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The test for injunctive relief in cases affecting freedom of expression contained 
in sections 12(1)-(3) HRA precisely require that such „careful scrutiny‟ be afforded by 
the courts. As is well known, those provisions both ensure that injunctions against 
publication cannot generally be granted unless the media party has been contacted and 
given the chance to contest them and then go on to set out the substantive test in 
section 12(3):  
 
„No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless 
the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication 
should not be allowed.‟  
 
This replaced the old American Cyanamid test, which was that the applicant had, as a 
threshold test, to show that he or she had a „real prospect of success‟ at final trial. If 
so, the court would consider where the „balance of convenience‟ lay94 between the 
case for granting an injunction and that of leaving the applicant to his or her remedy 
in damages. As Lord Nicholls observed in Cream Holdings v. Banerjee,
95
 under this 
approach:   
 
Orders imposing prior restraint on newspapers might readily be granted by the 
courts to preserve the status quo until trial whenever applicants claimed that a 
threatened publication would infringe their rights under article 8.
96
 
 
In other words, the danger to the press under this test was that, once the applicant had 
make out an arguable case for confidentiality, the court was generally inclined to 
grant an interim injunction on the basis that if the story were to be published, the 
information would lose its confidential character, and there would be nothing to have 
a final trial about.
97
 This consideration could be outweighed by the public interest 
defence at this stage, provided that the defence were supported by evidence and had a 
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credible chance of success at final trial.
98
 However, the pre-HRA test was considered 
potentially unfavourable to the media because in balancing the rights of the two 
parties, courts tended to take the view that while the plaintiff's right to confidentiality 
would be wholly defeated by publication, the press could always still publish the story 
if they won at final trial; they were thus inclined toward protecting the more fragile 
right of the plaintiff;
99
 the risk thus was that the publication of important stories could 
be delayed even where the story was of serious public importance. As Lord Nicholls 
observed, „Section 12(3) was enacted to allay these fears. Its principal purpose was to 
buttress the protection afforded to freedom of speech at the interlocutory stage.‟  
 Lord Nicholls went on to confirm that section 12(3) had replaced the old 
approach with a much more demanding standard:  
 
the effect of section 12(3) is that the court is not to make an interim restraint 
order unless satisfied that the applicant's prospects of success at the trial are 
sufficiently favourable to justify such an order being made in the particular 
circumstances of the case…the general approach should be that courts will be 
exceedingly slow to make interim restraint orders where the applicant has not 
satisfied the court he will probably ('more likely than not') succeed at the 
trial.
100
  
 
Thus, aside from in exceptional cases, where „a lesser degree of likelihood may 
suffice as a prerequisite‟,101 it is clear that the Human Rights Act has introduced a 
significant degree of extra protection for the press from interim injunctions. In order 
to decide whether the claimant is „likely to succeed‟ at trial, the court at the interim 
stage must take a view of the merits, giving „particular regard‟ to the freedom of 
expression of the newspaper and any public interest value of the publication.
102
 Thus, 
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„the court should not grant an injunction against a defendant who raises a defence of 
public interest that has a real prospect of success.‟103 As the Court of Appeal has 
remarked, „a claimant seeking an interlocutory injunction restraining publication 
[now] has to satisfy a particularly high threshold test‟.104 Professor Leigh agrees: „the 
American Cyanamid test has been replaced by [a] more exacting standard.‟105 
 Some of course will still contend that despite section 12, the courts will 
sometimes get it wrong and injunct a story that should be published. This possibility 
must be conceded. Very recently, for example, in Barclays Bank Plc v Guardian 
News and Media Ltd
106
 Blake J continued emergency injunctions against the 
Guardian preventing it from publishing confidential documents alleged to show an 
elaborate tax avoidance scheme by Barclays bank at a time when such schemes were a 
matter of intense public debate. It is not possible to comment in detail on the 
judgment here,
107
 but the decision clearly raises concerns about the use of interim 
injunctions to restrain stories of serious public interest. There were no competing 
Article 8 rights at stake and the documents plainly made a significant contribution to a 
very important story; moreover it was not clear that any real commercial damage 
would be done to Barclays through their publication. Nevertheless, it is submitted that 
if there is concern about courts being over-ready to use injunctions in such cases, the 
way to tackle this is not by allowing newspapers simply to bypass this possibility but 
to concentrate attention on improving judicial reasoning at the interim stage. It cannot 
be satisfactory that those who would plainly be entitled to an injunction to prevent a 
gross invasion of private life with little or no public interest justification should be 
denied the right even to seek such relief, because of a fear that sometimes the judges 
get it wrong. That would be the most imperfect kind of solution to the problem of the 
few doubtfully decided cases.   
 In addition to the specific provisions of the HRA, Spycatcher of course makes 
clear as a general principle that restrictions on freedom of expression must be 
necessary and proportionate. Since „even if a court is satisfied that victory for the 
claimant is likely, it still retains a discretion as to whether or not to order an 
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injunction,‟108 courts must, in exercising that discretion, consider whether granting an 
injunction is truly necessary. Thus courts will always consider whether the plaintiff 
can be adequately compensated through damages instead. While in cases concerning 
the revelation of private information, this is unlikely to be so, it allows a judge to 
examine carefully whether the plaintiff‟s claim really does require an injunction. For 
example, it may be suggested that where the objection to a photograph is not that it 
reveals information of an intimate character, but rather simply constitutes unwanted 
attention, albeit on an innocuous occasion – as in the JK Rowling litigation currently 
before the courts
109
 - damages, rather than an injunction may be considered an 
adequate remedy. This discretionary element is thus a further safeguard against the 
over-ready granting of injunctions.  
 
Practical Objections 
 
When confronted with the argument for a notification requirement, newspaper 
lawyers giving evidence to the Select Committee raised only the minor objection that 
it might sometimes be difficult to get hold of the subject of a story.
110
 Plainly this 
should be recognised in any notification requirement introduced, such that only 
reasonable attempts at contact would be required: persons who make themselves 
deliberately un-contactable by the media should not be able to complain about a 
failure to contact them. But perhaps more important concerns are raised by the 
possibility of future developments in the area of „misuse of private information‟. It is 
well known that, on one view of the Strasbourg decision in Von Hanover, the 
publication of any unauthorised photograph of any individual in any location, other 
than of someone plainly going about public business (such as speaking at a press 
conference), gives rise to a prima facie claim under Article 8,
111
 even if there is no 
harassment, humiliation or revelation of sensitive information. English law has not yet 
gone as far as this: no decision has yet imposed liability for the publication of such 
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innocuous photographs: some well known dicta in Campbell
112
 appeared to rule out 
liability in English law on such occasions in and Elton John failed when he brought 
such a claim.
113
 The decision of the Court of Appeal in the JK Rowling case
114
 comes 
closest to embracing such a position, but this was only a decision to allow the case to 
go to trial, and the court‟s reasoning seemed to turn mainly on the fact that a young 
child was involved. Nevertheless, the issue remains: should English law ever fully 
embrace the „absolutist‟ Von Hannover position, then the notification requirement 
could become onerous indeed: on every occasion in which it was proposed to publish 
a photograph of an individual without consent (other than the narrow exception of 
their being on „public business‟), the person would have to be contacted in advance of 
publication, giving them sufficient time to apply for an injunction. Were this situation 
to be reached, it might be necessary to adapt the notification requirement so that it did 
not apply in every case, but only where the material would be seriously invasive of 
privacy, in the sense of revealing intimate or sensitive personal information about an 
individual (which could include publishing photographs of them in a nude or semi-
nude state). It is in these kinds of situation that publication represents the irreversible 
loss of privacy that this paper has been discussing.  At present, the revelation of 
information of this sort appears to be where English law sets the threshold for Article 
8 to become engaged for domestic purposes.
115
 In contrast, publication of an anodyne 
photograph of a person in a public place does not constitute such an irreversible loss; 
as suggested above, damages would be an adequate remedy and therefore notification 
in such cases should not be required. Thus, if English law does move to full 
acceptance of what has been  described as Von Hannover in its „most absolutist 
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form,‟116then a distinction of this sort might have to be introduced in relation to the 
notification requirement.  
 Finally, there is the practical issue of the specifics of how a notification rule 
could be introduced and enforced. This issue is for another day, but possibilities 
include an amendment to section 12(3) HRA, placing a duty upon editors to contact 
potential claimants prior to publication, or the introduction of such a provision into 
the Press Complaints Commission Code - which must be taken into account by the 
courts under section 12 HRA. Alternatively, it could be judicially introduced as a rule 
of common law. As for enforcement, one possibility would be a judicial ruling that 
that the absence of such notification could, in appropriate circumstances, ground a 
right to exemplary damages, although this would require departure from the finding in 
Mosley that such damages are not available in privacy cases;
117
 non-notification could 
alternatively be seen as a factor giving rise to increased aggravated damages, or 
perhaps simply to enhanced compensatory damages – although courts would have to 
be prepared to make major awards if such a rule was to have any deterrent effect; 
alternatively, a failure to notify could be punished by the awarding of indemnity 
costs.
118
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Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that, given the very wide acceptance that an interim injunction 
will usually be the only satisfactory legal means of protecting privacy, it cannot be 
right that at present newspaper editors are in a position to deny the effective 
application of Article 8 at will, particularly when some of them are so plainly 
contemptuous of the values it protects and the judges who are seeking to apply it. It is 
not argued that such protection is required throughout Europe: in jurisdictions in 
which interim injunctions were too readily forthcoming, such a position might place 
press freedom in jeopardy. Conversely in states in which the media show a greater 
sense of responsibility in exercising their Article 10 rights, and greater respect for 
Article 8, such a rule might not be necessary.  The UK now has a secure system under 
the Human Rights Act for ensuring that interim injunctions are only issued where they 
are a necessary restriction upon press freedom; unfortunately, it also has a tabloid 
press that openly declares its hostility to the European Convention and judicial 
protection of privacy and a very clear pattern of publishing grossly invasive stories. In 
such circumstances, it seems clear that the UK must provide a means whereby the 
protection provided by injunctions is, as a matter of practical reality, „prescribed by 
law‟ and thus forestall the decisions of newspapers deliberately to strip from 
individuals the protection the Convention seeks to give them. Whatever mechanism 
was introduced to achieve this would answer to the particular circumstances of the 
UK; the aim would be to provide for UK citizens the possibility of the effective 
protection for their private life that was so plainly denied to Max Mosley.  
 
  
 
